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R.: Constitutional Law--State Taxation of Federal Property in Possess
CASE COMMENTS
Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 501 (1885) (dictum). The later decisions of
the Supreme Court; however, have indicated that expatriation can
be justified only in regard to foreign relations; as, for example, a
concession by the Government (in an expatriation case concerning
marriage to an alien) that residence abroad is necessary to effect expatriation. Savorgnan v. United States, 838 U.S. 491, 503 (1950).
There was also an implication that an expatriate must have gained a
new nationality before losing the old. Mackenzie v. Hare, 289 U.S.
299 (1915).
It would seem to be the better rule that expatriation should be
limited to those cases in which a person has acquired, or is in a position to acquire, a new nationality, and has voluntarily renounced
American citizenship, or has voluntarily participated in some activity
indicating allegiance to a foreign State and continued American
citizenship would serve to embarrass the United States in the field of
foreign affairs.
R. G. D.

CoNs'rrrnONAL LAw-STATE TAXATION OF FEDERAL P OPERTY
nm PossEssioN OF PrVATE CoNTRAcroR.-P, a subcontractor under a
prime contract with the federal government, brought an action
against the City and County of Detroit to recover taxes paid pursuant to the general property tax act of Michigan. MicE. ComT. LAw
§ 211.1 et seq. (1948). P had paid the taxes under protest, contending that the tax was in part assessed on federal property, since by the
terms of the contract title to work in progress and other materials
vested in the federal government upon partial payments of the contract price by the government, and hence such tax infringed the federal government's immunity from state taxation. The district court
entered judgment for P and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 284 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1956). Held, (5-4), that the
taxes, although styled property taxes, were in effect privilege taxes
in that they were levies on a private party for the privilege of possessing and using government property in its own business for private
gain and as such in no way infringed the federal government's immunity to state taxation. Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489

(1958).
It is well established that the property, officers and instrumentalities of the federal government are not proper subjects of state tax-
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ation. Such immunity from state taxation was found to be necessary
in order to maintain the essential freedom of government in performing its fumctions. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 579
(1819). But, as later noted, close distinctions in this area must be
observed to maintain this freedom without unduly limiting the taxing
power which is equally essential to both nation and state under our
dual system. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150
(1937). The task of trying to achieve this goal has not been easy.
In early cases state attempts to tax federal property were stricken down on an "economic incidence" test, that is, if the economic
burden of the tax fell on the federal government the tax was invalid.
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 316 (1870); Traves v. Texas Co.,
298 U.S. 893 (1936). But since it was realized that some portion of
the economic burden of a valid tax on federal property in the hands
of a private person would ultimately fall on the government, the test
was discarded. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 802 U.S. 184
(1937); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
Later cases looked only to the type of tax being imposed. If the
tax was a privilege tax, imposed on a private party for activities carried on within the state, and who in the course of such activities uses
government owned property, the tax was upheld even though measured in part or exclusively by the amount or value of the government property in his hands. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14
(1941). But if the tax was simply an ad valorem tax on federal
property in the hands of a private party, even though such private
party was to pay the tax, the tax was invalid. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). Such taxes, in order to be valid,
must be strictly on the privilege of engaging in a particular activity
which may employ government property and in no way have the
earmarkings of an ad valorem tax on the government property. See
Esso StandardOil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
In United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944),
Pennsylvania attempted to add the value of government owned machinery, on lease to the contractor, to the value of the contractor's
plant as a basis for an ad valorem property tax. The Court held the
tax invalid because it was partially on government property. In
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, supra, Tennessee imposed a privilege tax on the oil company for the storage of gasoline and included
government owned gasoline stored by the company in the valuation
for the tax. The tax was upheld by the Court on the ground that it
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was a tax on the company's exercise of the privilege to engage in such
operations and not on the government property. The distinguishing
feature of these two cases lies in the type of tax imposed, the ad
valorem tax "on' government property in Allegheny was struck
down; the privilege tax "on" the company in Esso Standardwas upheld though government property was used in determining the measure of the tax. The distinction here is vital in view of the fact that
the Court in the principal case believed that it was controlled by the
principles expressed in United States v. City of Detroit,355 U.S. 466
(1958), and United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484
(1958); these cases being decided on the same day, prior to the
principal case. In those cases private parties were using government
property for private profit, one under a lease, the other by permit.
The state statute provided that when exempt real property is used
by a private party in a business conducted for profit the private party
is subject to taxation to the same extent as though he owned the
property. United States v. City of Detroit, 855 U.S. at 468. The
Court upheld the tax in both cases, reasoning that the tax was not
"on7 government property but rather on the private party for the
privilege of using government property. The Court also held that
since users of other property, which had been exempt by the state,
were required to pay the tax, then the tax did not discriminate
against the users of federal property. Quaere, was the question of
discrimination present in those cases? Admittedly the state, having
granted certain property immunity from taxation, could withdraw
that immunity in the user's hands when such property is given to use
for private profit, but would it not seem that the real problem is
whether a state could tax federal property under such a statute since
its immunity from state taxation is not granted by the state but derived from the federal constitution? But this is a problem for another time. It is sufficient to say that the tax imposed in these two
cases was not an ad valorem tax but was more closely a privilege tax
and that they should have fallen under the principles of Esso Standard. It seems clear, if it be acceptable that these taxes were privilege
taxes, that whether a state attempt to tax government property failed
or succeeded, to this time, depended upon whether it was an ad valorem or a privilege tax.
The principal case introduced a new rule, that is, even though
the tax statute is considered and construed to be an ad valorem tax
statute and the tax imposed under it is a tax "on" property, 'the Court
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will look to the net effect of the tax and uphold it as a tax on a private party for the privilege of using government property. The
court in reaching this result reasoned that the tax should not be
struck down because it did not expressly state that the person in
possession is taxed for the privilege of using or possessing personal
property but that this was merely a verbal omission that could be
obviated by merely adding a few words to the statute. Detroit v.
Murray Corp., 355 U.S. at 493. The practical effect of adding words
to the taxing statute was to give to the statute the same net effect
as the taxing statute involved in City of Detroit and Township of
Muskegon, the only difference being that, in the two mentioned
cases, the state had specifically taxed the users of exempt "real"
property, while here the Court added words so as to include users of
exempt "personal" property. To illustrate the operation of the
statute with the added words, suppose that Murray had in his hands
government property which he was using in his business valued at
$10,000. He has also in his business his own property valued at
$10,000. The state imposes upon Murray an ad valorem tax. Under the holding of the principal case the state may (1) assess Murray's own property at value, and (2) assess the government property
at value to Murray for the privilege of using such property. If the
tax rate is three per cent of value assessed then Murray will owe a
tax of $600 under the ad valorem statute. The state then imposes on
Murray a tax for the privilege of carrying on his particular activity
within the state. Under the holdings of the privilege tax cases the
state may measure the tax by the total amount or value of the property in Murray's hands, thus the state (1) values the amount of Murray's property, and (2) values the amount of government property in
Murray's hands. If this tax rate is three per cent of valuation then
Murray will owe another $600 under the privilege tax statute, or a
total tax of $1,200. But suppose now that the property in Murray's
hands was not that of the government but of some other private individual who is a resident of the taxing state. Under the ad valorem
tax the state would (1) levy the tax "on" Murray's property, and (2)
levy the tax "on" the property of the private individual. Under this
statute Murray would have to pay the tax on both properties because
he was the possessor, but he could recover the amount paid on the
property not his own from the real owner. Of course under the
privilege tax Murray would have to pay such tax on the valuation of
both properties and could not recover against the owner of the property he was using. If the tax rate is again the same then Murray
would, in both taxes, have to pay a total tax of $1,200 but he could
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recover $300 of this amount from the true owner of the property under the ad valorem tax, for an adjusted total of $900. It would seem
that, because Murray is unfortunate enough to be using government
property, he must pay $300 more tax then if he had been using the
property of some private individual. Could the state also impose on
Murray a tax like that in City of Detroit or Township of Muskegon,
that is, a tax "for the privilege of using exempt property"? Or would
it be limited to either the tax collected under the ad valorem statute
or the tax collected under the privilege of using exempt property
statute?
It is believed that the holding of the principal case will have
more far reaching implications then was contemplated. Is it not now
possible for any state in the union to simply impose the traditional
ad valorem tax on private parties using government property and indirectly collect the same amount as though the tax were levied "on"
the government property, even though the same private parties are
not subjected to any form of a privilege tax? It is submitted, if the
result in this case is the desirable one, that such result should be
formulated into policy by Congress so that the positions, in this
area, of the federal government, the states, and the private party
doing business with the federal government will have some degree of
certainty.
J.L.R.

CoNTRAcrs-AcCaTANcEc BY TELEPHONE-PLACE OF CoNTRAcr.An action of account was brought by the offeror in a contract for
the reinsurance of certain risks. The outcome is dependent on the
enforceability of the contract, and due to differences in the statute of
frauds in Pennsylvania and New York (the New York statute contains the provision making contracts not to be performed within one
year unenforceable unless in writing; the Pennsylvania statute omits
this provision), the enforceability is in tuna dependent on the place
of the contract P, with offices in Philadelphia, traveled to New York
to communicate an offer to D. P returned to Philadelphia, where
he was contacted by telephone by D accepting the offer. Held, reversing the lower court, that acceptance by telephone of an offer
takes place where the words are spoken. Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 189 A.2d 688 (Pa. 1958).
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